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Abstract 
 
The rule of law is synonymous with political legitimacy. It ensures that citizens are 
protected from unpredictable and arbitrary interference. In his classical statement in the 
19
th
 century, A V Dicey declared that the rule of law embodies the notion that “no man 
is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the 
land”. This thesis considers whether the penal powers of Australian parliaments to 
imprison members of the public for contempt are compatible with this statement of the 
rule of law. It considers the historical development of the contempt power in the UK 
House of Commons at a time when the rule of law was not respected by the ruling 
monarch. It was a turbulent time when the UK Parliament acted also as a High Court of 
Parliament, exercising not only legislative but also judicial functions, a role not 
conferred on the Australian Parliament by the Constitution. This thesis contends that the 
penal powers offend the constitutionally entrenched separation of powers, a doctrine 
that protects the rule of law by ensuring that matters are heard only by independent and 
impartial tribunals, and that the power to imprison diminishes the implied freedom of 
political communication. It is argued that the procedures of parliaments and privilege 
committees often disregard the requirements of procedural fairness. The rule against 
bias cannot possibly be observed when a parliament determines matters of contempt, 
and there are serious procedural difficulties in according fair hearings to those that are 
accused of contempt. The thesis concludes that the penal powers of parliament are 
incompatible with the rule of law. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The rule of law is now universally accepted as central to political legitimacy.
1
 
Although the precise formulation of the rule of law is subject to much academic 
debate, it is generally agreed that the core concern of the doctrine is the protection of 
citizens from unpredictable and arbitrary interference.
2
 Fundamental to any 
conception of the rule of law, amongst other things,
3
 must be the existence of an 
independent and impartial judiciary
4
 separate from the other arms of government,
5
 
and the observation of principles of natural justice.
6
 Central to the argument 
presented in this thesis is the classical statement of A V Dicey on one particular 
aspect of the rule of law: 
No man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land.
7
 
                                                 
 
1
 Brian J Preston, ‘The Enduring Importance of the Rule of Law in Times of Change’ (2012) 86 
Australian Law Journal 175, 176, 188; Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, 
Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1-3. 
2
 Augusto Zimmermann, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2013) 83. 
3
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider at any length the formulation of the rule of law. A 
good discussion of the debate between the formalist and substantive construction of the rule can be 
found in Zimmermann, above n 2, 83-102. For an introductory discussion of the many elements of the 
rule of law see Preston, above n 1. 
4
 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press, 1979) 216; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Harvard University Press, 1999) 210; Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books, 2011) 27. 
5
 Anthony Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’ (Paper presented at Rule of Law Series, 
Melbourne University) 7 November 2001, 2. 
6
 Raz, above n 4, 217. 
7
 A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund Publishing, 8
th
 
ed, 1885, reprint 2001) 110. 
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This thesis examines whether the penal powers of parliament to punish contempts 
offend this aspect of the rule of law as articulated by Dicey.  
 
The penal powers of Australian legislative bodies are little known and little used. 
Despite this, their very existence should be a serious cause for concern in any society 
that is governed by the rule of law. It has been twenty years since an Australian 
legislature exercised its power of imprisonment.
8
 Since then, academic discussion of 
the penal powers of parliament has been incredibly limited. One can only assume 
that the lack of commentary is a direct result of parliaments’ contemporary 
reluctance to make use of the power. Significant contributions to the discussion have 
been made by respected commentators Anne Twomey,
9
 Enid Campbell,
10
 Gerard 
Carney
11
 and Geoffrey Lindell.
12
 This thesis seeks to build on those contributions to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of parliaments’ power to imprison for contempt, 
using Dicey's conception of the rule of law as its analytical framework. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the historical context of the contempt power. In Australia, the 
contempt power is inextricably linked to the powers of the United Kingdom House 
                                                 
8
 The last person to be imprisoned for contempt was Brian Easton by the Legislative Council of 
Western Australia in 1995. See below 31-33. 
9
 See Anne Twomey, ‘Reconciling Contempt of Parliament with the Separation of Powers’ (1997) 8 
Public Law Review 88. 
10
 See particularly Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege (Federation Press, 2003) and Enid 
Campbell, ‘Contempt of Parliament and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 10 
Public Law Review 196. 
11
 See Gerard Carney, Members of Parliament: Law and Ethics (Prospect, 2000). 
12
 See Geoffrey Lindell and Gerard Carney, ‘Review of Procedures of the House of Representatives 
Relating to the Consideration of Privilege Matters and Procedural Fairness’ (23 February 2007). 
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of Commons.  The historic conflicts between the House of Commons and the Crown, 
the courts and the House of Lords presented the underlying impetus for the powers of 
the House of Commons necessary to assert its independence and sovereignty. The 
constitutional landscape of the Australian Commonwealth safeguards the 
Commonwealth Parliament and State legislative bodies from the difficulties that the 
House of Commons encountered during its formative years.  
 
Chapter 3 then assesses the interaction of the contempt power with the Constitution. 
There is an undesirable tension between the contempt power and the doctrine of 
separation of powers envisaged by the Constitution. Separation of legislative and 
judicial power is a fundamental concept of the rule of law. It is possible that the 
inconsistency could be overcome by reading down section 49 of the Constitution, 
which confers the powers of the parliament, contrary to the view taken by the High 
Court in R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne.
13
 The contempt power also 
arguably offends the implied freedom of political communication outlined by the 
High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
14
 and subsequent 
decisions. 
 
Chapter 4 considers whether the principles of natural justice, or procedural fairness, 
can be adequately observed by parliaments exercising a penal jurisdiction. 
Procedural fairness is vital to the concept of natural justice. Consideration is given 
                                                 
13
 (1955) 92 CLR 157, 158 (Dixon CJ). 
14
 (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
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firstly to the rule against bias, that is, can a parliament and a committee of privilege 
be an independent and impartial tribunal? And secondly, to the hearing rule, that is, 
can a person accused of contempt be afforded a fair hearing? 
This thesis considers the exercise of parliaments’ penal jurisdiction only where the 
person accused of contempt is a member of the public. The investigation and 
punishment of contempts committed by a member of the parliament presents 
additional complexities. Whilst some of the arguments presented in this thesis could 
be equally applied to contempt by a member of parliament, others may not. The main 
focus is the penal powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. Where the powers of a 
State legislative body are similar, the arguments can likewise be applied. The 
differences between the Commonwealth and the State powers are outlined below in 
Part 1.2. 
 
1.1 Defining contempt of parliament 
 
The widely accepted definition of ‘contempt of parliament’ is provided in Erskine 
May’s Parliamentary Practice: 
Generally speaking, any act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of 
Parliament in the performance of its functions, or which obstructs or impedes any Member or 
officer of such House in the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency, directly or 
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indirectly, to produce such results, may be treated as a contempt even though there is no 
precedent of the offence.
15
 
 
This definition is broadly reflected by section 4 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 
1987 (Cth) which provides: 
 
Conduct (including the use of words) does not constitute an offence against a House unless it 
amounts, or is intended or likely to amount, to an improper interference with the free exercise 
by a House or a committee of its authority or functions, or with the free performance by a 
member of the member’s duties as a member. 
 
Given the broad nature of the contempt power and the parliaments’ discretion in its 
usage, it is impossible to definitively list what constitutes a contempt.
16
 In essence, 
the contempt power protects the functions of parliament and its members.
17
 It is 
important to note that the contempt power is a creature of its own, and not merely an 
incidence of the privileges of parliament. Historical categorisation of contempts as 
breaches of privilege “led to the erroneous notion that each contempt is a violation of 
an immunity”.18 Whilst it is true that a breach of privilege will constitute a contempt, 
                                                 
15
 Malcolm Jack (ed), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament (Lexis Nexis, 24
th
 ed, 2011) 251. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 John Waugh, ‘Contempt of Parliament in Victoria’ (2005) 26 Adelaide Law Review 29, 32. 
18
 Harry Evans and Rosemary Laing (eds), Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 13
th
 ed, 2012) 41. 
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a contempt need not necessarily be a breach of privilege.
19
 Where parliaments have 
provided examples of acts that may constitute contempts, they have always done so 
with the caveat that the list is not exhaustive and does not fetter the right of the 
parliament to declare a future act as a contempt even where there is no precedent.
20
 
 
In 1988 the Australian Senate agreed to resolutions relating to parliamentary 
privilege and contempt matters,
21
 in response to the recommendations contained in 
the Report of the 1984 Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1984 
Joint Select Committee).
22
 Draft guidelines in similar terms were also introduced to 
the House of Representatives, although to date no action has been taken to adopt any 
resolutions to indicate matters that may be treated as contempts.
23
 The 1988 Senate 
Resolutions provide that the following acts may amount to contempt: 
 interference with the senate; 
 improper influence of senators; 
 molestation of senators; 
 disturbance of the Senate; 
 service of writs; 
                                                 
19
 B C Wright and P E Fowler (eds), House of Representatives Practice (Commonwealth of Australia, 
6
th
 ed, 2012) 731. 
20
 See for example Parliamentary Privilege Resolutions Agreed to by the Senate on 25 February 
1988, Art 6. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliament of Australia, Final Report (1984) 
(1984 Joint Committee Report). 
23
 Wright, above n 19, 750. Hence the continuing relevance of the defined contempts provided in the 
1999 UK Joint Committee Report. 
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 false reports of proceedings; 
 disobedience of orders; 
 obstruction of orders; 
 interference with witnesses; 
 molestation of witnesses; 
 offences by witnesses; and 
 unauthorised disclosure of evidence.24 
 
In 1999, the UK Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1999 UK Joint 
Committee) devised a useful guideline on acts which may constitute contempts, 
whilst stressing that the list is not exhaustive.
25
 The Joint Committee concluded that 
the following acts could constitute contempts: 
 interrupting or disturbing the proceedings of, or engaging in other misconduct in the presence 
of, the House or a committee; 
 assaulting, threatening, obstructing or intimidating a member or officer of the House in the 
discharge of the member’s or officer’s duty; 
 deliberately attempting to mislead the House or a committee (by way of  statement, evidence 
or petition); 
 deliberately publishing a false or misleading report of the proceedings of a House or a 
committee; 
                                                 
24
 Parliamentary Privilege Resolutions Agreed to by the Senate on 25 February 1988, Art 6. 
25
 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliament of the United Kingdom, Report (1999) 
(1999 UK Report). 
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 removing, without authority, papers belonging to the House; 
 falsifying or altering any papers belonging to the House or formally submitted to a 
committee of the House; 
 deliberately altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying a paper required to be produced 
for the House or a committee; 
 without reasonable excuse, failing to attend before the House or a committee after being 
summoned to do so; 
 without reasonable excuse, refusing to answer a question or provide information or produce 
papers formally required by the House or a committee; 
 without reasonable excuse, disobeying a lawful order of the House or a committee; 
 interfering with or obstructing a person who is carrying out a lawful order of the House or a 
committee; 
 bribing or attempting to bribe a member to influence the member’s conduct in respect of 
proceedings of the House or a Committee; 
 bribing or attempting to bribe a witness; 
 assaulting, threatening or disadvantaging a member, or a former member, on account of the 
member’s conduct in Parliament; and 
 divulging or publishing the content of any report or evidence of a select committee before it 
has been reported to the House.
26
 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid [264]. There are additional contempts that have been omitted here relating specifically to 
members of parliament, and therefore not pertinent to the discussion in this thesis. 
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It is alarming, and an affront to the rule of law, that a person can be punished for an 
offence that is only defined in the most broad of terms. The lack of specificity creates 
great uncertainty in relation to what matters will constitute contempts. This, of 
course, has the potential to lead to arbitrariness. In general, houses and committees 
follow the precedents set by those before them.
27
 However, there has been and 
remains a resistance to definitively list what constitutes a contempt.
28
 The UK Joint 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege declared that ‘the categories of conduct 
constituting contempt are not closed’,29 paving the way for future conduct previously 
not considered to constitute contempt to later be found to constitute contempt.  
 
1.2 The power to punish contempts  
 
The power to punish contempts varies across jurisdictions. Only the Legislative 
Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory has no punitive power to punish 
contempts.
30
 Legislation in the Northern Territory expressly provides for judicial 
review of any warrant for imprisonment for contempt.
31
 The powers of the New 
                                                 
27
 J.A.G Griffith and Michael Ryle, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1989) 85. 
28
 See for example, 1984 Joint Committee Report; Legislative Council Select Committee into the 
Appropriateness of Powers and Penalties for Breaches of Parliamentary Privileges and Contempts of 
Parliament, Parliament of Western Australia, Report (2009). 
29
 1999 UK Report, above n 25, [264]. 
30
 Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 24. 
31
 Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1992 (NT) s 26. 
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South Wales Parliament are extremely limited, being able only to impose penalties 
on witnesses that refuse to answer lawful questions.
32
  
 
The contempt powers of the Victorian and South Australian Houses of Parliament 
are the same as those of the United Kingdom House of Commons at a specified 
date.
33
 Their power to punish contempts derives from the adoption of the ‘privileges 
immunities and powers’ of the House of Commons.34 The House of Commons (and 
the House of Lords) has for centuries been recognised as having the power to punish 
contempt by imprisonment.
35
 
 
Queensland’s Legislative Assembly has “the same power to deal with a person for 
contempt of the Assembly as the Commons House of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom had at the establishment of the Commonwealth to deal with contempt of 
the Commons House”,36 with some qualification. “Contempt” is defined similarly to 
section 4 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987,
37
 along with a note listing 
                                                 
32
 Parliamentary Evidence Act 1901 (NSW) s 11. The NSW Parliament also possesses limited powers 
in relation to members of the parliament. See Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424 for a detailed 
discussion of the operation of the contempt power in NSW. 
33
 21 July 1855. See Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 19; Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 38. 
34
 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 19(1) stipulates that the ‘privileges immunities and powers’ of the 
House of Commons on 21 July 1855, the date of Royal Assent to the Victorian Constitution, will 
apply. 
35
 Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege in Australia (Melbourne University Press, 1966) 111. 
36
 Parliament of Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 39. 
37
 Ibid s 37. 
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examples of contempts.
38
 In Queensland a person can only be imprisoned for 
contempt after first refusing to pay a fine within a reasonable time period.
39
 
 
In both Western Australia and Tasmania, the parliaments’ power to punish contempts 
is limited to certain offences defined by statute.
40
 In Tasmania the parliament has 
only the power to imprison offenders.
41
 In Western Australia, the parliament must 
first impose a fine and can then imprison an offender where the fine is not paid 
immediately.
42
 
 
Both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament were vested with wide powers 
similar to Victoria and South Australia.
43
 Section 49 of the Constitution provides: 
The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and 
of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as are declared by the 
Parliament, and until declared shall be those of the Commons House of Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth. 
The scope of the power was narrowed by the enactment of the Parliamentary 
Privileges Act 1987 (Cth). The power to punish contempt by defamation was 
                                                 
38
 Queensland’s interpretation rules mean that this note forms part of the text of the legislation; see 
Ibid s 7. 
39
 Ibid s 39. 
40
 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1891 (WA) s 8; Parliamentary Privileges Act 1858 (Tas) s 3. 
41
 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1858 (Tas) s 3; see also Enid Campbell, ‘Adjudication of 
Parliamentary Offences’ (2003) 22(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 173, 173. 
42
 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1891 (WA) s 8.  
43
 Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) s 49. 
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removed, except where the defamation is done in the presence of either House or a 
committee of a House.
44
 The power to imprison was expressly limited to a period not 
exceeding six months.
45
 Section 4 sets out elements of an offence against a House 
(although does not seek to restrict what may constitute an offence) in the following 
terms: 
Conduct (including the use of words) does not constitute an offence against a House unless it 
amounts, or is intended or likely to amount, to an improper interference with the free exercise 
by a House or committee of its authority or functions, or with the free performance by a 
member of the member’s duties as a member. 
Finally, section 9 provides that any warrant committing a person to imprisonment 
must provide particulars of the offence. A warrant providing particulars of an offence 
is likely to be subject to judicial review.
46
 
                                                 
44
 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 6. 
45
 Ibid s 7. 
46
 Greg Lindell, ‘Parliamentary Inquiries’ (1995) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 383, 413-418; 
Campbell, above n 10, 197. 
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2 THE CONTEMPT POWER IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
The powers of the House of Commons were won in a time when the United 
Kingdom was under the rule of men, not the rule of law; when the King still reigned 
supreme. It is true to say that the powers, rights and immunities of parliaments have 
been “jealously guarded” for centuries ever since.47 For the House of Commons, 
which battled the House of Lords, the courts and the Crown for centuries to establish 
its own independence, this could perhaps be readily explained. However, when the 
same powers were adopted by the Australian Parliament and other colonial 
legislatures, the logic was is less clear. Since then, successive parliaments have been 
very reluctant to voluntarily relinquish any of these powers.  In the United Kingdom 
the power to punish contempt was a “peculiar privilege” for centuries explained as 
being unique to the lex et consuetudo parliamenti.
48
 However, absent the historical 
underpinning crucial to understanding the powers, rights and immunities of the 
House of Commons, it is more difficult to find a compelling argument for “jealously 
guarding” the contempt power in the Australian context. 
 
This chapter places the contempt power in its early historical context to demonstrate 
that the compelling rationale for the power centuries ago is just not persuasive in the 
contemporary Australian context. Any argument on the historical significance of the 
contempt power must fail since the peculiarities necessitating the powers of the 
                                                 
47
 Carney, above n 11, 162. 
48
 Kielly v Carson (1842) 4 Moore PC 63, 89 (Parke B). 
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House of Commons do not exist in the Australian constitutional landscape, which is 
governed by the rule of law, and so the wholesale adoption of the UK House of 
Commons “privileges powers and immunities”49 by the constitutional drafters must 
be considered both undesirable and demonstrably erroneous.  
 
Parliaments’ use of the contempt power in Australia demonstrates that the power is 
in no way essential to the legislative functions of parliament. Observations of the 
three instances since federation when a person has been imprisoned for contempt 
highlight that the contempt power is both “anachronistic and petty”.50 
 
2.1 Protecting Parliament's sovereignty in early English history 
 
Given that the majority of Australian parliaments have derived their contempt 
powers from the House of Commons,
51
 to some extent or other, it is important to 
examine the early history of the contempt powers in the context in which they 
developed. The privileges and powers of the House of Commons were developed in 
a time before the separation of powers was clearly delineated, at a time of great 
jurisdictional conflicts between the crown, the courts and the two houses of 
                                                 
49
 Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) s 49. 
50
 Legislative Council Select Committee, Parliament of Western Australia, Report of Privilege 
Concerning the Non-compliance by Brian Easton with the Order of the House of June 22, 1994 
(1994) 16 (1994 Easton Report). 
51
 Except New South Wales. See discussion of the contempt power in each jurisdiction above Part 1.2. 
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parliament.
52
 It is trite to say that Australia has never faced jurisdictional struggles to 
the same extent. The overwhelming complexity of early British constitutional history 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
53
 However, important principles can be distilled 
from the key decisions regarding the peculiarities that faced the House of Commons. 
When contrasted with the Australian experience, this historical context demonstrates 
the absurdity of retaining the contempt power for Australian legislatures. 
 
The early assertion of punitive powers by the UK Parliament, and particularly the 
House of Commons, reinforced the Parliament’s claim to independence from the 
Crown.
54
 The impetus for protection was the need to counterbalance the supreme 
power and divinity of the Crown, and the intolerance of questioning or impeding the 
will of the King.
55
 Interference by the Crown in legal affairs dates back to the 
“dooms” of the 6th century56 and the prerogative of the Crown was absolute until the 
signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.
57
 However, even the signing of the Magna Carta 
did not stop the Crown from asserting its supremacy over the Parliament for 
centuries to come. 
 
                                                 
52
 Carney, above n 11, 159. 
53
 For a comprehensive history see Frederic William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 
(Cambridge University Press, 1908). 
54
 Campbell, above n 10, 189. 
55
 Ronald Goldfarb, 'The History of the Contempt Power' (1961) 1 Washington University Law 
Review 6, 18. 
56
 Maitland, above n 53, 1. 
57
 Ibid 15. 
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The beginning of the struggle to free the House of Commons from interference by 
the Crown can be traced back to the end of the 14
th
 century.
58
 In Haxey’s Case in 
1397,
59
 Thomas Haxey, thought to be a clerical proctor of the House of Commons, 
was condemned to death by the Lords following the introduction and subsequent 
passage of a bill to which King Richard II took offence. The lords passed judgment 
on the basis that "anyone who stirred up the Commons to make such demands was a 
traitor".
60
 This action by the Lords and the Crown infuriated the Commons, which 
began to assert its right to determine exclusively the exercise of its privileges.
61
 This 
led to the famous proclamation by Mr Speaker Thorpe in 1452 that the 
“determination and knowledge of that privilege belongeth to the Parliament, and not 
to the justices”.62 
 
Despite Thorpe’s proclamation, the powers and privileges of the House of Commons 
remained a point of contention through the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I.
63
 In 
1629 the Crown ordered the arrest of Sir John Eliot and two other members of the 
House of Commons for uttering seditious language during debate. When the matter 
was brought before the House of Lords, the Lords declared the arrest to be invalid as 
against the law and privilege of Parliament.
64
 During the stand-off between the 
Parliament and the Crown, the courts became increasingly reluctant to involve 
                                                 
58
 Carney, above n 11, 162; 1984 Joint Select Committee Report, above n 22, 24. 
59
 Cited in M L Gwyer (ed), Anson’s Law and Custom of the Constitution: Vol 1 Parliament (Oxford 
University Press, 5
th
 ed, 1922) 166-7. 
60
 Maitland, above n 53, 241. 
61
 Carney, above n 11, 162. 
62
 5 Rot Parl 239-40; cited in Jack, above n 15, 283. 
63
 Carney, above n 11, 162. 
64
 Eliot’s Case (1667-87) CJ 19, 25. 
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themselves in the affairs of Parliament. In 1677 the Earl of Shaftsbury was 
imprisoned for committing “high contempts”. Upon an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus the Court of King’s Bench held that they could not impeach the 
decision of the Lords, as a superior court, on a committal for contempt.
65
 However, 
not all courts took the same view as in the Earl of Shaftesbury’s case. In 1689 the 
House of Commons held two judges of the King’s Bench, Sir Francis Pemberton and 
Sir Thomas Jones, to be in contempt of parliament for their decision in the case of 
Jay v Topham.
66
 
 
This position taken by the courts was made more tenable at the end of the 17
th
 
century with the passing of two significant acts of parliament. The first was the 
declaration of the Bill of Rights 1689 (UK), which, amongst other things, declared 
the supremacy of the Parliament over the Crown.
67
 Importantly this curtailed the 
interference of the Crown in parliamentary affairs. The second was the passage of the 
Act of Settlement 1701 (UK). Crucially the tenure of judges was secured against 
dismissal at the prerogative of the Crown.
68
 After this time a judge could only be 
removed by the Crown at the request of both Houses of Parliament.
69
 Despite the 
courts now having more freedom in their decision making, the passage of these two 
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acts did not completely resolve the struggle for power between the House of 
Commons and the Crown. This continued into the 19
th
 century.
70
 
 
It is essential to remember that during this time the United Kingdom Parliament 
acted also as a judicial body, known as the High Court of Parliament.
71
 As a result of 
this status as a judicial body, the law of Parliament was argued to be distinct from the 
common law known to the regular courts. These arguments continued to be relied 
upon despite the House of Commons not having acted as a judicial body since the 
16
th
 century.
72
 On that basis Sir Edward Coke opined in the early seventeenth 
century that the “judges ought not to give any opinion of a matter of Parliament, 
because it is not to be decided by the common laws but secundum legem et 
consuetudinem parliamenti”.73 It was argued later by the Attorney General in 
Stockdale v Hansard
74
 that the lex parliamenti was as distinct from the common law 
as that law which was administered in the equity, admiralty and ecclesiastical 
courts.
75
 This recognition as a High Court of Parliament with an exlucisve lex 
parliamenti led to the Parliament being vested with powers and privileges similar to 
the common law courts including the power to punish contempts.
76
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Despite this, the competing views around the role of the common law courts in 
relation to the Parliament’s exercise of its powers and privileges continued into the 
nineteenth century. The view expressed by Sir Coke was taken up by De Grey CJ in 
Brass Crosby’s Case77 who held that “we cannot judge of the laws and privileges of 
the House [of Commons] because we have no knowledge of these laws and 
privileges”.78 These remarks were repeated by Lord Brougham LC in 1831, when his 
Lordship observed that “a court knows nothing judicially of what takes place in 
Parliament till what is done there becomes an act of the legislature”.79 
 
The settling of the relationship between the common law courts and the House of 
Commons began in the 19
th
 century. As Erskine May provides: 
It became clear that some of the earlier claims to jurisdiction made in the name of privileges by 
the House of Commons were untenable in a court of law; that the law of Parliament was part of 
the general law; that its principles were not beyond the judicial knowledge of the judges, and 
that the duty of the common law to define its limits could no longer be disputed. At the same 
time, it was established that there was a sphere in which the jurisdiction of the House of 
Commons was absolute and exclusive.
80
  
To this end it is important to note that many of the concessions were made by the 
House of Commons, and not by the courts. A pivotal case was Burdett v Abbot
81
 in 
1810. Burdett, a member of the House of Commons, was adjudged (by the House) to 
be guilty of contempt for the publication of a scandalous paper. Mr Burdett brought 
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an action in trespass against the Speaker when his house was entered by force in 
execution of a warrant issued in the Speaker’s name. Erskine May considers that the 
decision in Burdett v Abbot is significant in two ways, namely that: 
 [I]n the first place, the House of Commons did not resort to…committing for contempt 
counsel and others concerned in the prosecution of the Speaker. The House preferred 
voluntarily to submit one of its privileges to the jurisdiction of the courts. Secondly, following 
further dispute on the old battlegrounds of whether the law of Parliament was a particular law 
or part of the law of the land, and whether the courts were entitled (or indeed bound) to decide 
questions of privilege coming incidentally before them, the Speaker’s action was wholly 
vindicated.
82
 
 
The other elements fundamental to the settling of the relationship discussed by 
Erskine May can be found in the case of Stockdale v Hansard.
83
 Messrs Hansard 
were the official printers of the House of Commons. They printed (on order of the 
House) a report written by an inspector of prisons, which was laid on the Table of the 
House. Mr Stockdale brought an action against Messrs Hansard for libel. Messrs 
Hansard, represented by the Attorney General, relied exclusively on the privileges of 
the House and its order to print. Lord Denman concluded that the House had 
exclusive jurisdiction over its own internal proceedings, but it was for the courts to 
determine whether or not a claim of privilege fell within that category.
84
 His 
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Lordship also denied that the lex parliamenti was unknown to the common law 
judges.
85
 Lord Coleridge observed that: 
…whether directly arising or not, a court of law I conceive must take notice of the distinction 
between privilege and power; and where the act has not been done within the House (for of no 
act there done can any tribunal in my opinion take cognisance but the House itself) and is 
clearly of a nature transcending the legal limits of privilege, it will proceed against the doer as 
a transgressor of law.
86
 
 
As the powers of the Parliament became more settled, and less besieged by the 
Crown, the House of Commons became less aggressive in pressing its privileges 
through committal.
 87
 The House of Commons last committed for contempt in the 
late 19
th
 century.
88
 Charles Bradlaugh, a Member of the House, was restrained by a 
motion of the House from taking oath. The House further ordered the Serjeant to 
exclude Bradlaugh from the House. Bradlaugh sought a declaration from the court 
that the order of the House had been made ultra vires. The Court decided against 
Bradlaugh and held that the House of Commons has exclusive jurisdiction in relation 
to its internal affairs.
89
 
 
It is clearly evident from even this brief synopsis of the formative years of the House 
of Commons that the contempt power developed in a unique and peculiar context. It 
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was developed during a time when the monarch still reigned supreme, and the rule of 
law had not been fully recognised. This context is incredibly significant, and cannot 
be overlooked in any debate surrounding the contempt power in the Australian 
context. As Carney points out: 
Parliamentary privileges were Parliament’s response to threats posed by the Crown and the 
courts, often at the instigation of the Crown, to the capacity of Parliament to function as the 
sovereign legislature. Parliament used its privileges to secure this independence, and the 
dignity of its sovereignty.
90
 
Even writing 100 years ago Maitland observed that “their importance in the past has 
been great; their importance in the present we are apt, I think, to overrate”.91 This 
observation resonates even better in the contemporary context, particularly in the 
Australian constitutional context.  
 
2.2 The contempt power in the Australian historical context 
 
The earliest decisions from the Privy Council and from the British colonies make it 
abundantly clear that the contempt powers of the House of Commons were based on 
principles that have no application to other legislative bodies. It is for this reason, 
and with the support of these judgments, that it is contended that the contempt power 
never had, and certainly no longer has, any place in Australian legislatures. This 
argument can best be summarised by the findings of the US Supreme Court in the 
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case of Kilbourn v Thompson
92
 when considering whether the US Congress had 
contempt powers like the House of Commons. The Court held that: 
The powers and privileges of the House of Commons of England, on the subject of punishment 
for contempts, rest on principles which have no application to other legislative bodies, and 
certainly can have none to the House of Representatives of the United States – a body which is 
in no sense a court, which exercises no functions derived from its once having been a part of 
the highest court of the realm, and whose functions, so far as they partake in any degree of that 
character, are limited to punishing its own members and determining their election.
93
 
 
 
In Kielly v Carson
94
 the Privy Council, in deciding whether the House of Assembly 
of Newfoundland had the power to commit for contempt, held that legislatures of the 
British colonies were afforded “such [privileges] as are necessary to the existence of 
such a body, and the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to 
execute”.95 Colonial legislatures did not immediately inherit all of the powers and 
privileges of the House of Commons.
96
 Baron Parke said: 
“It is said… that this power belongs to the House of Commons in England; and this, it is 
contended, affords an authority for holding that it belongs as a legal incident by the Common 
Law, to an Assembly with analogous functions. But the reason why the House of Commons 
has this power is not because it is a representative body with legislative functions, but by virtue 
of ancient usage and prescription; the lex et consuetudo parliamenti, which forms a part of the 
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common law of the land, and according to which the High Court of Parliament before its 
division, and the Houses of Lords and Commons since, are invested with many peculiar 
privileges, that of punishment for contempt being one.
97
 
 
It is worth noting that the view of the Privy Council found relatively recent support 
in a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. In Armstrong v Budd,
98
 
Herron CJ followed the decision in Kielly v Carson
99
 in holding that the New South 
Wales Parliament did not have any inherent power to punish for contempt. His 
Honour relied on the High Court of Parliament argument to conclude that the House 
of Commons “is not a representative body with legislative functions, but derives its 
powers by virtue of ancient usage and prescription”.100 
 
The accepted view quickly became that colonial legislatures had the inherent power 
to take protective, but not punitive, action. In Fenton v Hampton
101
 the Privy Council 
declared invalid a decision of the Legislative Council of Van Diemen’s Land to 
commit the Comptroller-General at the Council’s pleasure. In delivering its decision, 
the Privy Council highlighted the distinction that the action was punitive, aimed at 
punishing the Comptroller-General.
102
 Sir James Colville neatly summarised the 
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distinction between punitive and non-punitive powers in the later case of Doyle v 
Falconer:
103
 
It is necessary to distinguish between a power to punish for contempt, which is a judicial 
power, and a power to remove any obstruction offered to the deliberations or proper action of a 
legislative body during its sitting, which last power is necessary for self-preservation…There is 
a great difference between such powers and the judicial power of inflicting a penal sentence for 
the offence. The right to remove for self-security is one thing, the right to inflict punishment is 
another. 
This important distinction has repeatedly found support, in the Privy Council,
104
 the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
105
 the High Court of Australia,
106
 and the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
107
 
 
Notwithstanding the Privy Council’s declaration that colonial legislatures did not 
inherit contempt powers at common law, it found that privileges and powers could be 
enacted for the peace, order and good government of the colony.
108
 During the 19
th
 
century it became accepted that legislatures could enact legislation providing a 
power to punish contempts.
109
 Despite the historical peculiarities leading to the 
contempt powers of the House of Commons, the majority of the Australian colonies 
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enacted privileges legislation.
110
 Particularly since the time of federation in 1901, 
and in the case of the Commonwealth Parliament, the historical peculiarities relating 
to the House of Commons have never existed in Australia. The Commonwealth 
Parliament has never acted as a judicial body, separation of legislative and judicial 
power is constitutionally secured, and the independence of judges is ensured by the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 
 
Unlike the troubled history between the Courts and the House of Commons in the 
United Kingdom, the judiciary and the legislatures in Australia have had a relatively 
sound relationship with regards to parliamentary privileges and powers. The 
privileges and powers of Parliament have for the most part avoided scrutiny of the 
courts. This to a large extent is due to the courts declaration on its role in relation to 
matters of parliamentary privilege. The seminal case is R v Richards; Ex parte 
Fitzpatrick and Browne.
111
    The High Court had to consider a grant of writs of 
habeas corpus in relation to warrants of imprisonment issued by the Speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly. Chief Justice Dixon, in delivering the decision of the Court, 
said that the case "is one of considerable importance, but we think its difficulty is not 
equal to its importance".
112
 In explaining the role of the courts in matters concerning 
parliamentary privilege, Dixon CJ enunciated the test, which remains unchallenged 
in the High Court to the present day: 
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Stated shortly, it is this: it is for the courts to judge of the existence in either House of 
Parliament of a privilege, but, given an undoubted privilege, it is for the House to judge of the 
occasion and of the manner of its exercise.
113
 
This test, the High Court held, had been determined conclusively by the established 
authority of the Privy Council in Dill v Murphy
114
 and Speaker of the Legislative 
Assembly of Victoria v Glass.
115
  
 
The Court took the view that section 49 of the Constitution was expressed in 
"unequivocal terms"
116
 as bestowing upon Commonwealth Parliament all of the 
powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons,
 117
 further holding that 
"the words are incapable of a restricted meaning".
118
 Any argument that the contempt 
powers conflicted with the constitutional separation of powers were quickly shut 
down by Dixon CJ: 
Perhaps, one might even say, scientifically – they belong to the judicial sphere. But our 
decision is based upon the ground that a general view of the Constitution and the separation of 
powers is not a sufficient reason for giving to these words, which appear to us to be so clear, a 
restrictive or secondary meaning which they do not properly bear.
119
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There is a strong argument that the High Court erred in taking this approach. The 
separation of powers issue is discussed further below in Part 3.1. Kirby J in Egan v 
Willis
120
 suggested that the reasoning in R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and 
Browne must be open to reconsideration.
121
 However, to date the issue has not come 
back before the High Court for reconsideration. Two Supreme Court decisions, 
Slipper v Magistrates Court of the ACT
122
 and Criminal Justice Commission v 
Nationwide News
123
 indicate that the position in R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick 
and Browne remains the approach taken by the judiciary to this day. Whilst Kirby J 
has indicated that a modern High Court may take a different approach to the court as 
constituted at the time of R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne, it appears 
that, given the Parliament's sparing use of the contempt power, the issue is unlikely 
to come before the High Court in the near future. As such, it is imperative that the 
Commonwealth Parliament, in light of this historical context of the contempt power 
and its uncomfortable position with the rule of law in Australia, should move to 
abolish the power to imprison without waiting on any invalidating decision from the 
High Court.  
 
2.3 Modern usage of the contempt power in Australia 
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Although parliamentary privileges committees continue to investigate alleged 
contempts and breaches of privilege on a regular basis, penalties are seldom 
imposed.
124
 The Senate Privileges Committee has in its history made only 12 
findings that a contempt had been committed.
125
 Out of those 12 occasions, only 
twice was a penalty imposed, once in 1971 and once in 2001.
126
 In the 1971 case a 
newspaper published the findings of a draft committee report. The Committee found 
that the publication constituted a breach of privilege and recommended that the 
editor and publisher be reprimanded.
127
 The Report was adopted by the Senate and 
the relevant persons attended the Senate and were reprimanded. In the 2001 case The 
Australian newspaper was found to have published evidence received in camera by a 
Senate committee.
128
 The Senate administered a “serious reprimand” to Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd.
129
 In the other 10 cases where a contempt finding was made, the 
Senate imposed no penalty.
130
 
 
The House of Representatives Committee of Privileges and Members’ Interests has 
made a finding of contempt on 16 occasions.
131
 Of those 16 ocassions, a penalty was 
only imposed in relation to three. Generally, the House of Representatives (and 
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indeed all legislatures with contempt powers) have preferred to merely record that an 
act was in fact a contempt, and in limited circumstances have taken the additional 
step of reprimanding or admonishing the offender.
132
 Parliament has often said that 
to do otherwise would be a waste of time of the House and likely “offend the dignity 
of the House”.133 In only two instances has the House of Representatives 
reprimanded for contempt. In 1965 the publishers of the Canberra Times and ten 
other newspapers were found in contempt and reprimanded for publishing an 
advertisement containing a photograph of the House in session.
134
 In 2007 Ms 
Harriett Swift was found in contempt of the House for deliberately misrepresenting a 
Member by producing and distributing documents fabricating the Member’s 
letterhead and signature. The House formally reprimanded Ms Swift.
135
 
 
The only time that the Commonwealth Parliament has committed individuals to 
prison for contempt of Parliament was in the Bankstown Observer matter.
 136
 The 
case is significant as it led to the only High Court decision that considers the 
contempt powers of the Commonwealth Parliament.
137
 The Hon Charles Morgan 
MHR, took issue with a newspaper article in the Bankstown Observer which 
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implicated him in an "immigration racket" and declared him unfit to be a member of 
the House if the allegations were true.
138
 In the Chamber the Member argued that the 
article was intended to blackmail and intimidate.
139
 The House debated the matter 
and resolved that it should be referred to the Committee of Privileges.
140
 The 
Committee heard from Mr Fitzpatrick, proprietor of the newspaper, and Mr Browne, 
author of the articles, who both agreed that they had no evidence to support the 
allegations raised in the articles.
141
 The Committee adjudged the two men guilty of 
contempt, and a motion was passed in the House that both men should appear at the 
bar of Parliament.
142
 Mr Fitzpatrick "offered a humble apology",
143
 whereas Mr 
Browne asserted his rights to a fair trial and made references to Adolf Hitler and the 
Star Chamber.
144
 Following a lengthy debate, including a proposed amendment to 
fine the two men, which was defeated, the House moved that Mr Fitzpatrick and Mr 
Browne be imprisoned until 10 September 1955.
145
 Unsurprisingly the decision of 
the House to imprison Mr Fitzpatrick and Mr Browne led to widespread 
condemnation, not least of all by the press.
146
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The Western Australian Parliament has twice exercised its power to imprison for 
contempt. The first case was when the Legislative Assembly imprisoned newspaper 
editor John Drayton to imprisonment in Fremantle Gaol for a fortnight.
147
 The 
Kalgoorlie Sun newspaper published articles that were highly critical of a 
government minister’s handling of a gold mining lease. The articles accused the 
minister, amongst other things, of having “robbed the prospector to fatten the 
capitalist”.148 A Select Committee was established to “take immediate steps to prove 
[Mr Drayton’s] innocence or guilt”, and to “find out if possible the reason for the 
malicious libels”.149 Mr Drayton was called to appear before the Committee, which 
he did, however he refused to give evidence on the basis that he could only offer 
hearsay evidence.
150
 The Committee reported the non-compliance to the Premier and 
the Legislative Assembly, and a resolution was passed that Mr Drayton would be 
fined 50 pounds.
151
 When Mr Drayton failed to pay the fine immediately – despite 
explaining that he was “without means, owing to circumstances over which [he had] 
no control”152 – the Legislative Assembly passed a motion committing him to 
prison.
153
 Mr Drayton was pardoned and released on 8 December 1904,
154
 with a 
majority of the Legislative Assembly agreeing that he had been sufficiently 
punished.
155
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The second - and much more recent - Western Australian example was the Brian 
Easton matter in 1995. In 1992 Mr Easton presented a petition that was tabled in the 
Legislative Council that “went beyond the normal range of petitions and accused a 
number of people of criminal misbehaviour…perjury and corruption”.156 A Select 
Committee was established to investigate whether there had been a breach of 
privilege. The Committee recommended that “the House adjudge Easton guilty of a 
breach of privilege of the House; and Easton be required to apologise in writing to 
the House for having petitioned the House in a misleading manner”.157 No action was 
taken on the report of the committee until 1994. The Legislative Council drafted the 
following letter of apology and demanded that Mr Easton sign the apology by 5 July 
1994: 
To the President and Members of the Legislative Council in Parliament assembled: I, Brian 
Mahon Easton, in answer to an order of the Legislative Council made on 22 June 1994 hereby 
make my apology to the Legislative Council and respectfully request that I be released from 
any further penalty that I may otherwise incur.
158
 
Easton refused to apologise. The majority of the Select Committee recommended 
that Easton should be imprisoned for his failure to apologise, a contempt in itself.
159
 
In minority the Hon Mark Neville MLC said that “imprisonment would be a harsh 
penalty and a censure by the House for failure to comply… is the most appropriate 
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available remedy”.160 The Hon Kim Chance MLC, also in dissent from the majority 
said: 
Regardless of the circumstances, imprisonment should not be an option available to this, or 
any, House of Parliament. It is possible that the exercise of committal powers for this offence 
would generally be regarded as anachronistic and petty.
161
 
Despite these sensible recommendations by the Members in minority, the majority 
(voting along party lines) recommended that Mr Easton be imprisoned to be released 
“any time after Mr Easton has spent seven days in custody”.162 The motion passed 
and Mr Easton was arrested and imprisoned in Casuarina Prison for seven days.
163
 
Indeed, the decision to imprison for refusing to apologise was, as the Hon Kim 
Chance MLC said, “petty and anachronistic”. Unsurprisingly the affair led to 
widespread condemnation and public outrage. Inside the Parliament the Leader of the 
Opposition, the Hon Jim McGinty MLA, said that he found the imprisonment of a 
person “without any right to be heard… to be quite horrific” and vowed that a Labor 
government would transfer the contempt powers to the courts.
164
 It is disappointing 
that the Labor government once elected never followed through with this promise. 
The Easton affair is a clear example of how the contempt power demonstrably 
offends the supremacy of the rule of law. 
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Contempt powers have been used in other states and territories to varying degrees, 
but no other Parliament has taken the severe step of imprisoning a member of the 
public since federation. The Legislative Assembly of Victoria came close to 
imprisoning two newspaper publishers shortly before federation in 1899. Reporters 
from the newspapers had reported on evidence given by witnesses appearing before a 
parliamentary committee that was open to the public and the media.
165
 The 
investigating committee ordered the imprisonment of the two publishers, finding that 
the reports were intended to unduly influence the committee.
166
 Ultimately the two 
publishers apologised to the Parliament, and the warrants for imprisonment were 
dropped.
167
 
 
Despite the limited recourse to imprisoning members of the public for contempt, it 
remains a very real power. As long as the power to imprison remains an option for 
parliaments, the potential for its use should not be ignored.
168
 Parliaments have 
generally avoided much scrutiny of their powers to punish contempts by exercising 
the power only rarely and with extreme caution. Both the House of 
Representatives
169
 and the Senate
170
 of the Commonwealth Parliament have a stated 
policy of using the contempt power as seldom as possible. But of course, the 
parliaments’ resolve to use the imprisonment power only as an extreme last resort 
does not mean that the draconian power should remain available. It is true that no 
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person has been imprisoned for contempt of parliament in Australia since Brian 
Easton in 1995. However, that should not be a reason for overlooking reform.  So 
long as the power remains, the supremacy of the rule of law in Australia is 
threatened. 
 
Reform has been considered in more recent times in a number of jurisdictions. At the 
Commonwealth level, the most comprehensive review of Parliament's penal 
jurisdiction was undertaken by the 1984 Joint Select Committee. The Committee 
found that the Commonwealth Parliament should retain its penal jurisdiction and that 
there should be "no substantive changes made to the law of contempt".
171
 However, 
the Committee resolved that the penal jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly, 
recommending: 
That each House should exercise its penal jurisdiction in any event as sparingly as possible and 
only when it is satisfied that to do so is essential in order to provide reasonable protection for 
the House, its Members its committees or its officers from improper obstruction as is causing, 
or is likely to cause, substantial interference with their respective functions. Consequently, the 
penal jurisdiction should never be exercised in respect of complaints which appear to be of a 
trivial character or unworthy of the attention of the House; such complaints should be 
summarily dismissed without the benefit of investigation by the House or its committees.
172
 
Although this recommendation appears to be generally followed by the House, it was 
never implemented in any formal way. What's more, whilst the House still retains the 
power to imprison, it may still be used. There has been no other comprehensive 
review of the Commonwealth Parliament's contempt power in more recent times.  
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From time to time committees have recommended the abolition of the imprisonment 
power. In 2009 a Select Committee of the Western Australian Legislative Council 
recommended that "the power of the Western Australian Parliament to imprison be 
abolished, save that the Parliament should retain power to detain temporarily persons 
misconducting themselves".
173
 In making its recommendation the Committee said 
that "the sanction of imprisonment in the present day is no longer necessary or 
appropriate to uphold the privileges of Parliament"
174
 and further that "imprisonment 
should be available only to a court of law".
175
 This recommendation was 
unfortunately never implemented. Earlier this year a differently constituted Standing 
Committee of the Legislative Council reported that it "does not support the abolition 
of the Council's power to imprison" and "sees no compelling reason" to do so.
176
 
This contrasting opinion highlights the fickle nature of parliamentary committees and 
the danger in relying on non-binding resolutions as opposed to a legislative abolition 
of the imprisonment power. Abolition of the power to imprison was also supported 
by the UK House of Commons Committee of Privileges in 1977,
177
 and the UK Joint 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999.
178
 To date the UK Parliament has not 
implemented the recommendations of these two committees.  
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It should be apparent from this chapter that the power to imprison for contempt is 
unjustified in the Australian context and offensive to Dicey's conception of the rule 
of law. The contempt powers of the House of Commons were developed as a result 
of the “peculiar” nature of the UK Parliament acting as a High Court of Parliament 
exercising judicial functions, and owes a lot to the conflict between Parliament and 
the courts and the Crown. This has never been an issue for Australian legislative 
bodies. The early Privy Council decisions make it clear that the power to imprison 
was never intended for the colonial legislatures. The usage of the imprisonment 
power in Australia causes serious concern, highlighting an inappropriate use of a 
"petty and anachronistic" power. The historical evolution of the penal powers of 
parliaments demonstrates that the power is contradictory to the rule of law.  
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3 CONTEMPT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Imprisonment is an extreme step resulting in the removal of fundamental personal 
liberties. It has been classically regarded, and for great reason, that the power to 
imprison should be exercised only by an independent judiciary.
179
 Since Federation 
the Australian Constitution has enshrined the doctrine of the separation of judicial 
power, ensuring that judicial power is exercised only by an independent judiciary 
and free from the arbitrary decision making of the executive and the legislature.
180
  
 
How, then, in a constitutional system devoted to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and the supremacy of the rule of law, can the Parliament still be empowered 
to exercise a penal jurisdiction? This chapter considers the argument that the 
contempt power is entirely inconsistent with the constitutional separation powers, 
and thus incompatible with the rule of law. Judicial power should be exercised only 
by courts established by Chapter III of the Constitution, and on that basis the 
jurisdiction to punish contempts ought to be transferred. It then considers how 
section 49 of the Constitution should be interpreted, arguing that it should be read 
down so that the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament can only be valid to the 
extent that they are necessary in supporting the legislative functions of the 
Parliament. Finally, it considers the more novel interaction of the contempt power 
with the implied freedom of political communication. 
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3.1 The constitutional separation of powers  
 
When a parliament imprisons a member of the public for committing a contempt, it 
performs a function that has traditionally been understood to be an exclusive function 
of the courts of law.
181
 This exercise by a parliament of the power to imprison would 
seem, on its face, to be at odds with the constitutionally entrenched separation of 
powers and the rule of law. The separation of judicial power, according to Deane J, is 
the most important constitutionally implied guarantee, ensuring that citizens can be 
subjected to judicial power only by the courts of law.
182
 This separation of judicial 
and executive power ensures that the rule of law prevails over the arbitrary decisions 
of rule-makers, a most fundamental principle of the rule of law.
183
 This section 
considers whether the contempt powers offend the doctrine of separation of powers 
and, if so, why we should be concerned. 
 
3.1.1 Separation of powers in the Australian Constitution 
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The Australian Constitution implies a separation of judicial and legislative power.
184
 
The structural basis for the separation of judicial power was entrenched in Chapter 
III of the Constitution. Section 71 provides that: 
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be 
called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, 
and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction… 
Although the separation is not explicitly prescribed in the text of the Constitution, it 
was implied from the beginning of federation. Quick and Garran in their 1901 
treatise wrote that the Constitution: 
Vests the legislative, executive and judicial powers respectively in distinct organs; and, though 
no specific definition of these powers is attempted, it is conceived that the distinction is 
peremptory, and that any clear invasion of judicial functions by the executive or by the 
legislature, or any allotment to the judiciary of executive or legislative functions, would be 
equally unconstitutional.
185
 
Whether the founders of the Constitution intended a doctrine of separation of powers 
is unclear.
186
 However, the separation of powers featured heavily in the early 
decisions of the High Court,
187
 and by 1910 respected constitutional commentator W 
H Moore commented that "between the legislative and executive power on the one 
hand and judicial power on the other, there is a great cleavage".
188
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In the contemporary context the fundamental importance of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers should not be understated. In Street v Queensland Bar 
Association
189
 Deane J said that: 
The Constitution contains a significant number of express or implied guarantees of rights and 
immunities. The most important of them is the guarantee that the citizen can be subjected to 
the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power only by the "courts" designated by Ch III (s 
71).
190
 
In Polyukhovich v Commonwealth
191
 Deane J opined that: 
The Constitution is structured upon the doctrine of separation of judicial from legislative and 
executive powers. Chapter III gives effect to that doctrine in so far as the vesting and exercise 
of judicial power are concerned. Its provisions constitute “an exhaustive statement of the 
manner in which the judicial power of the Commonwealth is or may be vested”.192 
… 
Accordingly, the Parliament cannot, consistently with Ch III of the Constitution, usurp the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth by itself purporting to exercise judicial power.
193
 
Further judicial support for the separation of power was found in Attorney-General 
(Cth) v Breckler,
194
 where Kirby J said that: 
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The wisdom, particularly in a federation (indeed in any modern society), of separating the 
judicial power so that it “cannot be usurped or infringed by the executive or the legislature”195 
remains as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. The importance of 
maintaining the separation of the judicial power and protecting it from attempts to undermine 
or alter the constitutional scheme set up by Ch III,
196
 demands continuing vigilance on the part 
of the courts. 
197
 
 
There are recognised exceptions to the doctrine of the separation of powers. The 
most common of these exceptions is executive detention, for example in relation to 
foreign aliens.
198
 Imprisonment for contempt of parliament has long been held to be 
an exception to the doctrine. The leading authority considering the exceptions to the 
separation of powers is the High Court decision of Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration,
199
 where it was said that: 
There are some functions which, by reason of their nature or because of historical 
considerations, have become established as essentially and exclusively judicial in character. 
The most important of them is the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of 
the Commonwealth… 
The exceptions referred to were the gaoling of the accused persons pending trial, detaining 
those suffering from mental or infectious illnesses, punishment for contempt of 
Parliament….200 
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It remains unclear what the rationale of the Court was in establishing punishment for 
contempt of parliament as an exception to the constitutional requirement for judicial 
power to be exercised only by Chapter III courts. No reason was provided in Chu 
Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, save for to note that it is a recognised 
exception. Since that decision, the High Court has consistently recognised contempt 
of parliament as an exception.
201
 In Polyukhovich v Commonwealth Deane J 
explained the impetus for the exception in the following terms: 
The first exception relates to the power of each of the Houses of Parliament to punish for 
contempt or breach of privilege… [which] flows from the provisions of s 49 of the 
Constitution which, unlike s 51, were not expressly made subject to Ch III.
202
 
This reasoning appears to be flawed. The correct approach to interpreting section 49 
of the Constitution is discussed further below in Part 3.2. In Egan v Willis
203
 Kirby J, 
referring to the separation of powers issue raised in argument in R v Richards; Ex 
parte Fitzpatrick and Browne,
204
 commented that this aspect of the decision "may 
one day require reconsideration".
205
 Whilst the opportunity for reconsideration by the 
High Court has not arisen, it is clear that the exception is illogical and inconsistent 
with the rule of law. 
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3.1.2 The (il)logic of the contempt of parliament exception 
 
Generally speaking exceptions to the exclusive exercise of judicial power are 
justified on the basis that the resulting detention is not punitive in character or 
intended to punish the detained person. In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration their Honours held that “the involuntary detention of a citizen in 
custody by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under our system of 
government, exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of 
adjudging and punishing guilt”.206 On that basis, it has been held that detention 
which is not punishment for an offence is not an exercise of judicial power. In Al-
Kateb v Godwin
207
 executive detention of refugees and asylum seekers under the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was found not to “impinge upon the separation of powers 
required by the Constitution” as “immigration detention is not detention for an 
offence”.208 
 
Conversely to the scenario in Al-Kateb v Godwin, imprisonment for contempt of 
parliament is blatantly punitive in nature and designed to punish the perpetrator. To 
that extent, the categorisation of the Commonwealth Parliament's contempt powers 
as an exception to the doctrine of separation of powers is somewhat mystifying. 
Traditionally, the High Court has expressed time and time again a great reluctance to 
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allow non-judicial bodies to adjudge and punish criminal guilt.
209
 The other 
exceptions referred to in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration and the cases 
that followed permitted executive detention only where that detention is non-punitive 
in nature. The only other departure from that general rule, allowing a non-judicial 
body to exercise a punitive jurisdiction, is the power for military tribunals to enforce 
military discipline, in some circumstances, but not all.
210
 The rationale for the 
military exception is “largely pragmatic and based on historical and practical 
considerations”.211 The military power requires different considerations to the 
contempt power of Parliament. Suffice it to say for the purposes of this thesis that the 
military power exception is also not without its difficulties. Decisions on the military 
power highlight “considerable divergence of view among the judges”.212 The attempt 
to remove the military tribunal from the military command structure was invalidated 
by the Court as it required the Australian Military Court to exercise the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth without complying with the Chapter III constitutional 
requirements.
213
 The High Court has since confirmed that there must be a system of 
review within the military command for the military power to remain valid.
214
 The 
difficulty of the Court in justifying the military power exception, albeit on different 
grounds to the contempt power, provides further weight to the fact that the High 
Court, and the Constitution, strive to maintain a robust separation of judicial power. 
                                                 
209
 See generally Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 
434, 444 (Griffiths CJ); Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, 173 (Isaacs J); 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 413, 422 (Starke J); Harris v 
Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 174 (Gaudron J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501; 
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245; South Australia v 
Totani [2010] HCA 39, [382]. 
210
 See R v Bevan, Ex parte Elias and Gordon (1942) 66 CLR 452. 
211
 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 627 (Deane J). 
212
 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Butterworths, 4
th
 ed, 1997) 272. 
213
 Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230. 
214
 Nicholas v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 66. 
 D Harrop (2014) Imprisonment for Contempt: Are the Penal Powers of Parliament Compatible with the Rule of Law? 
 
47 
 
3.1.3 The power to imprison: legislative or judicial in nature? 
 
Another important, but easily answered, question is whether or not the power to 
imprison is legislative or judicial in nature. The necessity of asking this question, the 
answer to which on its face ought to seem trite, is the reasoning of the High Court in 
R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne.
215
 The Court took the view that the 
contempt power does not offend the doctrine of the separation of powers as it is a 
legislative power, not a judicial power. Dixon CJ said: 
… [t]throughout the course of English history there has been a tendency to regard those powers 
as not strictly judicial but as belonging to the legislature, rather as something essential, or, at 
any rate, proper for its protection. This is not the occasion to discuss the historical grounds 
upon which these powers and privileges attached to the House of Commons. It is sufficient to 
say that they were regarded by many authorities as proper incidents of the legislative function, 
notwithstanding the fact that considered more theoretically – perhaps, one might even say, 
scientifically – they belong to the judicial sphere.216 
In would seem that the Court made a fundamental, and highly regrettable, error of 
law on this point. His Honour classifies the contempt power as “not strictly judicial 
but as belonging to the legislature”. Although the power may arguably belong to the 
legislature, it is clear that, in any event, the power exercised ought to be categorised 
as judicial power. The “many authorities” his Honour refers to are presumably the 
early decisions of the House of Lords and Privy Council that I considered 
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extensively above.
217
 If that is the case, then the High Court completely failed to 
appreciate the underlying historical context so vitally important to the contempt 
powers as incidentally belonging to the High Court of Parliament, a judicial organ. 
 
The contempt power is clearly a judicial power for, where Parliament imprisons a 
member of the public for contempt of Parliament, it "performs the duties of 
prosecutor, judge and gaoler".
218
  The decision that the contempt power ought 
properly be characterised as legislative in nature must be erroneous. Chief Justice 
Dixon was correct in saying that “theoretically…[the contempt power]…belongs to 
the judicial sphere”.219 But more than just theoretically, the contempt power should 
in practice be exercisable only by a Chapter III Court. To find otherwise is to 
diminish the supremacy of the rule of law embodied in the constitutional separation 
of powers. If the court had have undertaken a more detailed examination of the 
contempt powers in its historical context, it ought to have decided that the 
Commonwealth Legislative Assembly’s power to imprison offends the doctrine of 
the separation of powers. Anne Twomey has suggested that the Court: 
 "[m]ight have concluded that the power to punish people for defamatory words about 
members of Parliament was not essential for the protection of Parliament or its legislative 
functions, and being punitive in nature it was a judicial power which could not be appropriately 
exercised by a legislative body".
220
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The High Court has consistently held that determination of guilt and the imposition 
of criminal punishment is an exercise of judicial power.
221
 This judicial power 
should be exercised only by a Chapter III court. There is no logical basis for the 
contempt power of parliaments being an exception to the doctrine of the separation 
of powers. 
 
 
3.2 Reading down section 49 of the Constitution 
 
In R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne
222
 the High Court in upholding the 
validity of the Commonwealth Legislative Assembly’s contempt powers held that: 
a general view of the Constitution and the separation of powers is not a sufficient reason for 
giving to these words [in section 49], which appear to us to be so clear, a restrictive or 
secondary meaning which they do not properly bear.
223
 
To the contrary it would have been entirely appropriate for the High Court to have 
adopted an approach to the interpretation of section 49 of the Constitution that 
supports the doctrine of the separation of powers and upholds the rule of law. Section 
49 should be read down so that only those powers that are necessary to support the 
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legislative functions of the parliament remain.
224
 This approach would 
constitutionally invalidate the Parliament’s power to imprison members of the public 
as punishment for committing a contempt, but retain the power to temporarily detain. 
 
Any consideration of the correct approach to interpreting section 49 of the 
Constitution must begin by placing the provision in its context. Section 49 provides 
that: 
The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and 
of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as are declared by the 
Parliament, and until declared shall be those of the Commons House of the Parliament and of 
its members and committees, at the establishment of the Commonwealth. 
The flaws associated with the wholesale adoption of the powers, privileges and 
immunities of the UK House of Commons in section 49 of the Constitution have 
been discussed extensively above.
225
 Those arguments need not be repeated here. 
Interestingly, the prospect of the Commonwealth Parliament exercising judicial 
power in punishing contempts was not discussed at all at the Constitutional 
Conventions.
226
 This is despite many of the delegates expressing concerns in relation 
to the broad power being given to the Parliament by the text of section 49.
227
 Left 
unaltered, the “powers” of the UK House of Commons as at 1901 were extensive. 
The determination of what constituted a contempt was completely unfettered, as was 
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recognised by the 1984 Joint Select Committee.
228
 To that extent, the 
Commonwealth Parliament would be left with powers that it would otherwise be 
constitutionally prohibited from exercising.
229
 This would include the power to 
adjudge criminal guilt and impose punishments. As discussed in the preceding 
section, this offends the constitutionally entrenched separation of judicial power.
230
 
 
The structure of the Constitution supports the reading down of section 49 to 
invalidate the contempt power. Chapter I of the Constitution, titled “The Parliament”, 
outlines the legislative power. Unlike the House of Commons, which traditionally 
operated as a part of the High Court of Parliament with both legislative and judicial 
functions,
231
 the Australian Parliament was not given judicial functions. This view 
was articulately opined by Forster J in Attorney-General (Cth) v MacFarlane:
232
 
…The power to act as a ‘grand inquest’ or ‘grand inquisitor’ is, when properly understood, a 
function of the House of Commons and not a power. The House [of Commons] has a 
legislative function and has an inquisitorial function. ..This inquisitorial function does not 
depend in any way upon the legislative function and could and does operate quite 
independently of it…It is true to say that the House of Commons had in 1900 these two 
functions, legislative and inquisitorial, it seems plain to me that the only function committed by 
the Imperial Parliament to the Commonwealth Parliament was the legislative function and not 
the inquisitorial function.
233
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The exercise of judicial power was granted exclusively to the courts set out in 
Chapter III of the Constitution. Given this separation of legislative and judicial 
power, section 49, which is found in Chapter I outlining the legislative power, should 
be read down to invalidate the contempt power as it is an exercise of judicial power 
that is reserved for Chapter III courts.  
 
Whether or not section 49 ought to be read down depends on the method of 
constitutional interpretation. The methods of constitutional interpretation are 
numerous and a cause of great disagreement.
234
 Arguably the best approach to 
constitutional interpretation is “one that makes sense of its text, structure, historical 
meaning and intended purposes understood as an integrated whole”.235 A discussion 
of approaches to constitutional interpretation would merit a thesis in itself. It is 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to say that the High Court’s decision in R v 
Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne
236
 placed too high an emphasis on the 
text of the Constitution alone
237
 without giving due consideration to the 
Constitution’s structure and contemporary context. It seems axiomatic that to read 
section 49 in isolation is a fragmented and undesirable approach to contemporary 
constitutional interpretation. As Laurence Tribe has commented: 
To be worthy of the label, any “interpretation” of a constitutional term or provision must at 
least seriously address the entire text out of which a particular fragment has been selected for 
interpretation, and must at least take seriously the architecture of the institutions that the text 
                                                 
234
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defines…Read in isolation, most of the Constitution’s provisions make only a highly limited 
kind of sense. Only as an interconnected whole do these provisions meaningfully constitute a 
frame of government for a nation of states.
238
 
If a structural view of the Constitution was evaluated, the entrenched separation of 
powers must necessarily lead to a reading down of section 49 of the Constitution.  
 
If section 49 was read down in the manner suggested, the Commonwealth Parliament 
would still retain the powers to support its legislative functions. This would 
necessarily include the power to detain a person (on a temporary basis) who, for 
example, is disrupting proceedings or obstructing the work of the Parliament or a 
committee.
239
 However, it would invalidate the power of the Parliament to imprison 
for contempt as it offends the doctrine of the separation of powers so fundamental to 
the rule of law. Such an interpretation would then be consistent with the approach 
taken by the High Court in the last three decades - post the decision in R v Richards; 
Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne
240
 - in relation to the powers of military tribunals,
241
 
where the Court has found a balance that ensures the exercise of power by military 
powers remains consistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
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3.3 The implied freedom of political communication 
 
An argument that parliaments’ power to imprison for contempt should be invalidated 
by virtue of the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication is not, 
admittedly, an easy one to make. It appears that the argument has only been 
articulated academically on one occasion in 1999 by Professor Enid Campbell.
242
 
Whilst there is merit in the arguments put forward by Professor Campbell, the High 
Court’s application of the implied freedom since it’s original conception in the 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Willis
243
 and Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth
244
 has been incredibly conservative. In fact, until the High Court 
invalidated New South Wales political donation laws last year in Unions New South 
Wales v State of New South Wales,
245
 a law had not been invalidated on the basis of 
the implied freedom since 1992.
246
 The implied freedom has made a resurgence in 
the High Court in the last couple of years,
247
 giving greater relevance to the argument 
presented in this part. However, the extent of the operation of the implied freedom 
remains unclear. It is a real possibility that, if tested in a case before the High Court, 
the implied freedom could be used to invalidate the Commonwealth Parliament’s 
power to imprison for contempt.
248
 In any event, the argument taken in totality with 
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the other constitutional difficulties discussed above, can only lend further support to 
an argument that the power to imprison is inconsistent with the Constitution and the 
rule of law. 
 
3.3.1 Content of the implied freedom 
 
Freedom of political communication was first implied into the Constitution by the 
High Court in 1992. In two consecutive decisions, the High Court began its “implied 
rights revolution”249 and became “embroiled in controversy”250 when it held on both 
occasions that the Constitution provided impliedly for a freedom of political 
communication. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Willis
251
 legislation proscribing words 
that were calculated to bring the Australian Industrial Relations Commission into 
disrepute was declared to be invalid. In Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth,
252
 handed down simultaneously, the Court invalidated legislation 
prohibiting political advertising on radio and television during election periods. In 
invalidating the laws, the majority of the High Court, albeit taking different roads to 
get there, came to a conclusion that the constitutional system of representative and 
                                                 
249
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responsible government impliedly gives the electorate the freedom to discuss 
political issues.
253
 Justice Brennan said: 
To sustain a representative democracy embodying the principles prescribed by the 
Constitution, freedom of public discussion of political and economic matters is essential (as the 
European Court of Human Rights recognised in The Observer and the Guardian v United 
Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153 at 178): it would be a parody of democracy to confer on the 
people a power to choose their Parliament but to deny the freedom of public discussion from 
which the people deprive their political judgments. Freedom of public discussion of 
government (including the institutions and agencies of government) is not merely a desirable 
political privilege; it is inherent in the idea of a representative democracy.
254
 
Chief Justice Mason made a similar finding in Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth: 
Absent such freedom of communication, representative government would fail to achieve its 
purpose of government of the people through their elected representatives; government would 
cease to be responsive to the needs and wishes of the people and, in that sense, to be truly 
representative… the raison d’etre of freedom of communication in relation to public affairs 
and political discussion is to enhance the political process…thus making representative 
government more efficacious.
255
 
The different opinions of the justices of the High Court in the early freedom of 
political communication cases created deep divisions, with strong dissenting 
judgments in the few years following.
256
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It was not until the 1997 decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
257
 
that the High Court unanimously held that the Australian Constitution implied a 
freedom of political communication. The Court held that the freedom comes not 
from the concept of “representative and responsible government” per se,258 but from 
the structure and text of the Constitution.
259
 Commentators have argued that the 
reliance on the text and structure of the Constitution to support the implied freedom 
is unsustainable.
260
 However, it remains the dominant rationale for the implied 
freedom of political communication. The formulation of a two-stage test of validity 
under the implied freedom was enunciated by the Court in the following terms: 
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political 
matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the law effectively burdens that 
freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment 
of which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative and responsible government?
261
 
The Lange test was modified slightly in Coleman v Power.
262
 The second limb of the 
test was reformulated to read: 
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Is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative 
and responsible government?
263
 
The Lange/Coleman test remains the current test in Australian Constitutional law. 
However, the formula has not been seamlessly applied,
264
 and has attracted strong 
criticism in the High Court from time to time.
265
  It is important to note that the 
freedom of political communication is a limitation on legislative power only, it is not 
a source of individual rights.
266
 
 
3.3.2 Does the implied freedom constrain parliaments' contempt powers? 
 
If the implied freedom can be applied to the penal powers of parliaments to imprison 
for contempt, the Lange/Coleman test will certainly be relevant in the context of the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives and Senate. In Theopanous v Herald & 
Weekly Times Ltd
267
 it was held that the implied freedom also applies to the common 
law,
268
 which means that the implied freedom can be applied to those state 
legislatures which have contempt powers akin to those of the House of Commons 
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without any statutory limitation.
269
 Freedom of political communication has also 
been found by the High Court to be an implied term of State constitutions.
270
 This 
could act to limit the contempt powers in those legislatures where the contempt 
powers are derived from the State constitutions or legislative enactments.
271
 
Theoretically then, the implied freedom of political communication can operate to 
limit contempt powers in all Australian legislatures. However, the High Court is yet 
to decide whether the implied freedom constrains the powers and privileges of 
parliaments.
272
 
 
The Commonwealth Parliament has already, to a limited extent, constrained its own 
power to punish contempt where the alleged contempt involved political 
communication. The Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) removed the power to 
punish libels as contempts. Section 6 provides that: 
(1) Words or acts shall not be taken to be an offence against a House by reason only that those 
words are defamatory or critical of the Parliament, a House, a committee or a member. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to words spoken or acts done in the presence of a House or 
Committee.  
The caveat provided by subsection 6(2) means that defamation or criticism made 
inside the parliament or before a parliamentary committee can still be considered a 
contempt and punished under section 7. These penalties include imprisonment not 
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exceeding six months,
273
 or a fine not exceeding $5000 for a natural person or 
$25,000 for a corporation.
274
 Other contempts, such as interference and disturbance 
offences listed as contempts in the Senate Resolutions,
275
 could be seen to inhibit 
freedom of political communication. It is difficult to say conclusively, as the High 
Court has never attempted to provide a definition of "political communication".
276
 
However, it would appear that the contempt powers could be used to curtail political 
communication in the sense of criticism of the House, a committee or a member. 
 
If the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) and the common law curtail political 
communication, could the High Court invalidate the law on the basis of the implied 
freedom? It is clear that the implied freedom limits legislative power in relation to 
criminal offences.
277
 Surely, then, any legislative or common law provision 
providing a penal sanction should be afforded the constitutional protection of the 
implied freedom of political communication. Professor Campbell has argued that 
there "seems to be no reason why the powers of Parliaments to make laws respecting 
the powers, privileges and immunities of their Houses, committees and members 
should not be subject to the same constraint".
278
 So long as the Lange/Coleman test is 
satisfied, any laws of Parliament providing penal sanctions should be subject to the 
implied freedom. The first limb of the Lange/Coleman test, "does the law effectively 
burden freedom of communication about government or political matters, either in its 
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terms, operation or effect?"
279
 can clearly be answered in the affirmative in relation 
to parliaments' contempt powers. Where an Australian parliament has exercised the 
power to imprison, it has been because of a defamatory or critical publication in 
relation to the parliament or a member.
280
  
 
The second limb of the Lange/Coleman test asks whether the law is "reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is compatible 
with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and 
responsible government…"281 It is difficult to see how imprisonment for contempt of 
parliament could possibly be considered as “reasonably appropriate and adapted”. 
The judgment of Sir Colville in Doyle v Falconer highlighted:
282
 
It is necessary to distinguish between a power to punish for contempt, which is a judicial 
power, and a power to remove any obstruction offered to the deliberations or proper action of a 
legislative body during its sitting, which last power is necessary for self-preservation…There is 
a great difference between such powers and the judicial power of inflicting a penal sentence for 
the offence. The right to remove for self-security is one thing, the right to inflict punishment is 
another. 
If the "legitimate end" of the contempt power is the self-preservation of parliament, 
as is often cited, then the power to imprison is not a necessity. The restriction on 
political communication coupled with the threat of imprisonment is arguably an 
                                                 
279
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impermissible curtailing of the constitutionally implied freedom under the 
Lange/Coleman test.
283
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4 CONTEMPT AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
The duty to accord natural justice, or procedural fairness, is in modern times 
universally accepted and arguably the most important principle of administrative 
law.
284
 Aside from this, it is also a fundamental aspect of the rule of law.
285
 Justice 
Mason in Kioa v West
286
 put the obligation in the following terms: 
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law 
duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative 
decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear 
manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.
287
 
It is true to say that a determination of contempt of parliament is not an 
administrative decision, and any House of Parliament or Committee would not 
therefore be strictly bound to comply with the rules of procedural fairness that would 
otherwise apply to administrative bodies and tribunals.
288
 However, the principles of 
natural justice still ought to be applied by committees of privilege.
289
 As French CJ 
has recently asserted, "the norms of procedural fairness reach well beyond the 
confines of the courtroom… They are important societal values applicable to any 
form of official decision-making which can affect individual interests".
290
 In 
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Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission
291
 the High Court noted the wide reach of 
procedural fairness: 
It is now clear that a duty of procedural fairness arises, if at all, because the power involved is 
one which may "destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests, or legitimate 
expectations" … thus, what is decisive is the nature of the power, not the character of the 
proceeding which attends its exercise.
292
 
To that extent, then, the need for committees of privilege to afford procedural 
fairness is "based not on legality but on legitimacy".
293
 
 
 In recent years committees of privilege at both the Federal and State level have 
reported the importance of ensuring procedural fairness for those accused of 
contempts.
294
 Both the House of Representatives
295
 and the Senate,
296
 along with 
other Australian legislative bodies,
297
 now seek to ensure that the principles of 
natural justice and procedural fairness are observed, to the extent possible, in 
contempt proceedings. 
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Despite these endeavours, it is doubtful that any Australian legislative body or 
committee of privilege could possibly accord true procedural fairness to a person 
accused of contempt. Respected academics Professors Lindell and Carney, in their 
comprehensive review of privilege matters and procedural fairness undertaken for 
the House of Representatives in 2007,
298
 concluded that "it was not possible for the 
House or its Privileges Committee to accord procedural fairness to those accused of 
serious contempt at the level which contemporary standards of justice require".
299
 
Following that review, and a report from the Committee of Privileges and Members' 
Interests,
300
 the House of Representatives adopted procedures for the examination of 
witnesses.
301
 While these procedures, and similarly the procedures adopted by the 
Senate in the 1988 resolutions,
302
 go some way to providing better procedural 
fairness outcomes for those accused of contempts, it remains the case that they 
cannot meet the standard that the community standards now expect.  
 
This chapter considers the shortcomings of the procedure for dealing with contempts 
in relation to procedural fairness. The procedure will be assessed against the two 
traditional elements of procedural fairness – the rule against bias (nemo debet esse 
judex in propria sua causa) and the hearing rule (audi alteram partem).
303
 In relation 
                                                 
298
 Lindell and Carney Review, above n 12. 
299
 Ibid 2. 
300
 2008 Procedures Report, above n 294. 
301
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 November 2009, 12890-1. 
302
 Parliamentary Privilege Resolutions Agreed to by the Senate on 25 February 1988. 
303
 Creyke, above n 284, 684. 
 D Harrop (2014) Imprisonment for Contempt: Are the Penal Powers of Parliament Compatible with the Rule of Law? 
 
66 
to the rule against bias, it will be contended that neither a legislative body nor a 
committee of privilege can possibly be an independent and impartial tribunal when 
dealing with matters of contempt. Further, the procedure is likely to fall foul of 
Australia's obligations under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1976. In relation to the hearing rule, it will be contended that the 
procedures in relation to contempt deny an accused person the full right to be heard. 
The denial of procedural fairness offends the supremacy of the rule of law.
304
 
 
4.1 The rule against bias 
 
The rule against bias was famously formulated by Coke CJ in Dr Boneham's Case
305
 
as the Latin maxim quia aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa,
306
 which can 
be understood to mean that “decision making must be and be seen to be impartial”.307 
To accord procedural fairness and uphold the rule against bias, any contempt 
determination must then be free from both actual and perceived bias. As Lord 
Hewart CJ held in R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy,
308
 “justice should not 
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to done”.309 It is 
difficult to see how a legislature, in considering and deciding an allegation of 
contempt, can be free certainly of perceived bias, but also quite likely actual bias. 
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An apprehension of bias will arise where “a fair-minded lay observer might 
reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the 
resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”.310 The test for reasonable 
apprehension of bias can otherwise be characterised in these terms: 
Those requirements of natural justice are not infringed by a mere lack of nicety but only when 
it is firmly established that a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in the minds of those 
who come before the tribunal or in the minds of the public that the tribunal or a member of it 
may not bring to the resolution of the questions arising before the tribunal fair and 
unprejudiced minds.
311
 
In Webb v R
312
 Deane J said that there are at least four distinct categories of bias 
disqualification: 
The first is disqualification by interest, that is to say, cases where some direct or indirect 
interest in the proceedings, whether pecuniary or otherwise, gives rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of prejudice, partiality or prejudgment. The second is disqualification by 
conduct, including published statements. That category consists of cases in which conduct, 
either in the course of, or outside of, the proceedings, gives rise to an apprehension of bias. The 
third category is disqualification by association. It will often overlap with the first (eg, a case 
where a dependent spouse or child has a direct pecuniary interest in the proceedings) and 
consists of cases where the apprehension of prejudgment or other bias results from some direct 
or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or 
                                                 
310
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otherwise involved in, the proceedings. The fourth is disqualification by extraneous 
information.
313
 
It is difficult to envisage how the public could have any confidence in a privilege 
committee, or a House, appearing to be an independent and impartial tribunal in 
dealing with an allegation of contempt. 
 
Lindell and Carney have noted that “obviously, complete impartiality is not possible 
where members of the House adjudge an allegation of contempt against their own 
House”.314 This is obvious given that, when a legislative body considers any 
allegation of contempt, it "performs the duties of prosecutor, judge and gaoler".
315
 
Regardless, the parliaments could still act to ensure independence and impartiality to 
the extent that it is possible. Presently, neither the House of Representatives nor the 
Senate have adopted any binding rules on the issue of bias. The Senate 
Resolutions
316
 are completely silent on the issue. Similarly, the House of 
Representatives procedures do not address the situations in which a member of the 
committee of privileges should be excluded from participating in a case of alleged 
contempt. Although it may be standard practice for a member to exclude herself or 
himself where there is a potential conflict,
317
 it is bewildering that there is no formal 
resolution outlining a protocol for the exclusion of committee members in situations 
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where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.
318
 The only justification provided 
for this unofficial policy of self-recusal is lack of concern in regards to bias in 
comparable jurisdictions.
319
 This justification is not persuasive. 
 
The importance of the rule against bias is strengthened by Australia’s obligations 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976, to which 
Australia is a signatory.
320
 Article 14(1) relevantly states: 
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law… 
It is arguable that the current procedure of both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in dealing with matters of contempt violates the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal guaranteed by Article 14. A comparison may be drawn from the 
well-known decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Demicoli v Malta.
321
 
In that case, it was held that the Maltese House of Representatives violated Article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 by failing to provide an 
independent and impartial tribunal to determine the allegations of contempt levelled 
against Mr Demicoli.
322
 The Court found that Mr Demicoli’s contempt proceedings 
were criminal proceedings (despite Malta’s Constitutional Court declaring that they 
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were not),
323that “the House of Representatives undoubtedly exercised a judicial 
function in determining the applicant’s guilt”,324 and that consequently Mr Demicoli 
ought to have been afforded the protections under Article 6.
325
 Although the 
Australian Parliament’s contempt procedure’s compliance with Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 is unlikely to ever be 
scrutinised judicially, it should be treated as a serious concern that the Federal 
Parliament is likely breaching an international convention aimed at protecting basic 
human rights.  
 
Even supposing it is possible to eliminate apprehended bias in a committee of 
privilege, which is dubious, the problem is further exacerbated in that the committee 
does not make any final determination. The decision to impose any penalty, 
including in the most serious case imprisonment, can only be made by the 
legislature, which is not bound by the recommendations of the committee of 
privilege.
326
 This cannot possibly be consistent with the rule against bias. As 
Professor Pitt-Cobbett noted as far back as 1908: 
A political assembly has never been, and never will be, capable of exercising judicial functions 
with that calmness and impartiality which are essential to their proper discharge… Trial by an 
interested tribunal must always be foreign to British ideas of justice.
327
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This procedure for dealing with allegations of contempt cannot possibly be 
consistent with the rule against bias, not only a fundamental principle of 
administrative law but also an obligation under international law and key to the rule 
of law. 
 
4.2 The hearing rule 
 
The second limb of procedural fairness, the hearing rule, was classically stated by 
Mason J in Kioa v West:
328
  
…when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or 
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know to know the case sought to be made 
against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it.
329
 
Rights in that context include personal liberty and proprietary rights,
330
 both of 
which can be affected by contempt proceedings where a penalty of imprisonment or 
fine is imposed respectively. The required content to fulfil the hearing rule will 
necessarily depend on the circumstances of the case.
331
 As Tucker LJ stated in 
Russell v Duke of Norfolk:
332
 
There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry 
and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the 
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circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, 
the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth…But, whatever standard is adopted, 
one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting 
his case.
333
 
The requirements for procedural fairness are greatest in relation to judicial decisions, 
where “curial standards of procedural fairness will apply to the fullest extent”.334As 
has already been extensively argued above, it must be found that a parliament 
making a determination in relation to contempt is acting judicially. In light of this, 
high standards of procedural fairness ought to be applied. However, as Lindell and 
Carney have observed, the great range of penalties available to a legislature in 
relation to contempt could lead to differing procedural fairness requirements, relative 
to the severity of the punishment.
335
 Arguably, the highest standards should apply in 
relation to all contempt proceedings as the imposition of the severest penalties is 
available in all cases. As it was put in the 1984 Joint Select Committee Report: 
It is a very serious matter for anyone whose conduct attracts the attention of one of the Houses 
and is brought before its Privileges Committee. Accordingly, the onus is on the Houses to 
accord to him the fairest of hearings, and the most complete opportunity to defend himself.
336
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As outlined above, the content of the hearing rule will vary from case to case, 
depending on the nature of the power being exercised.
337
 In the case of contempt 
proceedings, procedural fairness ought to arguably include: 
 
 notice of the hearing and any adverse allegations, and a right to respond to those 
allegations;
338
 
 disclosure of any 'credible, relevant or significant' evidence;339 
 adequate time to prepare a case;340 
 the right to have the decision based on an evidential foundation;341  
 the right to be represented by counsel;342 and 
 an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.343 
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The current practice of both the House of Representatives and the Senate fails to 
meet these standards in procedural fairness. Following Lindell and Carney’s 
Report,
344
 the House of Representatives did take positive steps forward, adopting the 
majority of the report’s recommendations in the formal procedures of the House.345 
However, the new guideline procedures have largely brought the House of 
Representatives procedure into line with that of the Senate, which themselves have 
significant procedural fairness deficiencies. Despite the Commonwealth Parliament’s 
purported attempt to accord the “fairest of hearings”, the current procedures still fall 
short of the standard required by the hearing rule.  The next sections address what 
should be regarded as the most significant deficiencies and those that, for the most 
part, are unable of being adequately remedied. These arguments naturally present the 
strongest impetus for removing the penal jurisdiction of parliaments on the basis that 
it is incompatible with the rule of law.  
 
4.2.1 Adequate notice and reasonable time to respond 
 
It is fundamental to notions of procedural fairness that a person should know the case 
against her or him in order to be able to defend her or himself. In Kanda v 
Government of Malaya
346
 Denning LJ said that “if the right to be heard is to be a real 
right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to 
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know the case which is made against him”.347 It is difficult for a committee of 
privilege to comply with this requirement given the very nature of the functions of a 
parliamentary committee. Contempt proceedings may begin inquisitorial and later 
become adversarial if enough evidence is gathered to proceed with specific 
allegations of contempt.
348
 The specific non-disclosure of information in 
investigative proceedings was outlined by the High Court in Nationwide Companies 
and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd:
349
 
It is of the very nature of an investigation that the investigator proceeds to gather relevant 
information from as wide a range of sources possible without the suspect looking over his 
shoulder all the time to see how the inquiry is going. For an investigator to disclose his hand 
prematurely will not only alert the suspect to the progress of the investigation but may well 
close off other sources of inquiry.
350
 
This may alleviate an investigative body of strict compliance with the rules of 
procedural fairness. However, generally an investigative body will do no more than 
investigate an allegation. The powers of privilege committees extends much further.  
As Lindell and Carney point out: 
No other institution of government has the power to investigate an allegation of contempt as 
well as effectively charge those alleged to be responsible, try the charge, and impose a penal 
sanction.
351
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It is for precisely this reason that the notice of allegation must be specifically 
adequate to allow the accused to respond. 
 
The current procedural rules of both the House of Representatives and the Senate are 
slightly different in relation to the adequacy of the notice. The House of 
Representatives procedure states: 
Any person who is the subject of proposed investigation by the committee must be notified in 
advance of the specific nature of the allegations made against them, preferably formulated as a 
specific charge, or if this is not possible, of the general nature of the issues being investigated, 
in order to allow them to respond.
352
 
The Senate procedure states: 
A person shall, as soon as practicable, be informed, in writing, of the nature of any allegations, 
known to the committee and relevant to the committee’s inquiry, against the person, and the 
particulars of any evidence which has been given in respect of the person.
353
 
The important point is that the current procedure allows the committees to state only 
the “general nature of the issues” in the case of the House of Representatives, and 
only “allegations known to the committee” in the case of the Senate. This cannot 
provide “adequate content…in sufficient particularity to enable the person affected to 
know the case they have to meet”.354 
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The procedures relating to the time to respond are also inadequate. Where a 
committee of privilege levels specific allegations of contempt against a person, that 
person should be given a reasonable time to respond to the allegations.
355
 The current 
formulation in the procedural rules of both Houses is too ambiguous. The rules 
provide that “the committee shall extend to that person all reasonable opportunity 
and time to respond to such allegations…”356 The House of Representatives did not 
implement Lindell and Carney’s recommendation “that specific provision be made 
for witnesses appearing before a Privileges Committee to be afforded a reasonable 
period of notice for which to prepare their evidence”,357 instead following the 
procedure of the Senate. An accused “must have an opportunity quietly to consider 
the allegations against him and, if necessary, to obtain material to rebut them”.358 
The current formulation does not express the rights that ought to be afforded to 
ensure procedural fairness.  
 
4.2.2 The rules of evidence 
 
Committees of privilege are not bound by the rules of evidence.
359
 This again reflects 
the fact that parliamentary committees are generally inquisitorial bodies. To that 
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extent, the guidance of Lord Diplock in Mahon v Air New Zealand
360
 is considered 
instructive: 
The first rule is that the person making a finding in the exercise of [an investigative] 
jurisdiction must base his decision upon evidence that has some probative value… The second 
rule is that he must listen fairly to any relevant evidence conflicting with the finding and any 
rational argument against the finding that a person represented at the inquiry, whose interests 
(including in that term career or reputation) may be adversely affected by it, may wish to place 
before him or would have so wished if he had been aware of the risk of the findings being 
made. 
 
The technical rules of evidence applicable to civil or criminal litigation form no part of the 
rules of natural justice. What is required by the first rule is that the decision to make the 
finding must be based upon some material that tends logically to show the existence of facts 
consistent with the finding and that the reasoning supportive of the finding, if it be disclosed, is 
not logically self-contradictory.
361
 
 
The obvious distinction is that his Lordship was referring specifically to investigative 
bodies in their usual sense. A committee of privilege considering a matter of 
contempt is acting in a judicial manner.
362
 For that reason, “greater regard should be 
given to the risks entailed in any departure from those rules [of evidence] the more 
adversarial the Committee’s proceedings become”.363 
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4.2.3 Representation by counsel 
 
The right to be represented by legal counsel is not absolutely recognised by either the 
House of Representatives or the Senate.
364
 The procedural rules of both Houses state 
that: 
A person appearing before the committee may be accompanied by counsel, and shall be given 
all reasonable opportunity to consult counsel during that appearance.
365
 
This provision only provides that an accused can be accompanied by counsel, and 
consult counsel throughout the proceedings. It does not necessarily confer any right 
of representation whereby counsel can speak on behalf of the accused. Aside from 
that provision, a committee “may authorise” the examination of witnesses by 
counsel.
366
 Representation is then effectively at the discretion of the committee, and 
limited to examination of witnesses. 
 
The general principles of the requirement of legal representation were stated in Cains 
v Jenkins:
367
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On the authorities there is no absolute right to representation even where livelihood is at stake. 
But that is not to say that in all cases a tribunal can refuse it with impunity. The seriousness of 
the matter and the complexity of the issues, factual or legal, may be such that refusal would 
offend natural justice principles.
368
 
The seriousness of contempt proceedings is evident in the potential penalties, 
including imprisonment. It is unfathomable to think that a person who could be 
imprisoned could be denied legal representation. Likewise, there is no argument 
against legal representation that has any merit. The 1984 Joint Select Committee 
rejected arguments that legal representation would lead to “endless complexity, 
technicality, and to great protraction in hearing times”.369 In any event, it is surely 
offensive to any Western notion of justice and antithetical to the rule of law that 
considerations of “complexity and technicality” would be given more weight than a 
person’s right to defend her or himself from potential imprisonment.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
 A V Dicey wrote in the 19
th
 century that “no man is punishable or can be lawfully 
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land”.370 This proposition 
became a fundamental element of Dicey’s classical statement of the rule of law, a 
doctrine now synonymous with political legitimacy.
371
 In democratic societies, the 
rule of law is the notional ideal of a fair and good society. It follows, then, that any 
society operating inconsistently with the rule of law should aspire to eradicate those 
inconsistencies. 
 
The penal powers of Australian legislative bodies continue to undermine the 
supremacy of the rule of law. Section 49 of the Constitution, along with the 
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), are being used to allow the Commonwealth 
Parliament to exercise a penal jurisdiction, in clear conflict with the rule of law. This 
thesis has sought to identify the key issues with the penal powers of parliament to 
answer the question, are the penal powers of parliament compatible with the rule of 
law? It should be evident at this stage that the answer to that question is that clearly 
they are not.  
 
                                                 
370
 Dicey, above n 7, 110. 
371
 Preston, above n 1, 176, 188; Tamanaha, above n 1, 1-3. 
 D Harrop (2014) Imprisonment for Contempt: Are the Penal Powers of Parliament Compatible with the Rule of Law? 
 
82 
In R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne
372
 the High Court justified the 
penal power of the House or Representatives on the basis that the power had 
throughout history been regarded as “proper incidents of the legislative function”.373 
If this were the case, then perhaps the penal powers would not offend the rule of law 
to the extent that they do. However, as discussed comprehensively in chapter 2, this 
is simply not the case. The penal powers formed part of the lex parliamenti at the 
time the House of Commons was exercising judicial functions as part of the High 
Court of Parliament.
374
 The Australian High Court should have found that the 
principles leading to the powers and privileges of the House of Commons have no 
application to the Australian Parliament, as the US Supreme Court did in Kilbourn v 
Thompson.
375
 As the Australian Parliament exercises only legislative functions, it is a 
clear breach of the rule of law for either house to perform “the duties of prosecutor, 
judge and gaoler”376 in determining allegations of contempt of parliament. 
 
The penal powers of parliament offend the Constitution. In Street v Queensland Bar 
Association
377
 Deane J said that the guarantee that citizens can only be subject to 
judicial power exercised by Chapter III courts is the most important right in the 
Constitution.
378
 This ensures that citizens have matters determined by a independent 
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and impartial tribunal, essential to Dicey’s formulation of the rule of law.379 
Allowing the contempt power to remain an exception to the separation of powers is 
illogical. Section 49 of the Constitution should be read down to allow the 
Commonwealth Parliament to exercise only those powers that are fundamental to the 
maintenance of its legislative functions, and consistent with the constitutional 
separation of powers.
380
 If section 49 was read down in the manner suggested, it 
would also ensure that the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament do not 
contravene the implied freedom of political communication as set out in the 
Lange/Coleman test.
381
 
 
 
Another core feature of the rule of law is the observation of principles of natural 
justice, or procedural fairness.
382
 The current procedures of the Commonwealth 
Parliament, and other Australian parliaments, fall short of the required standard. In 
relation to the rule against bias, “complete impartiality is not possible where 
members of the House adjudge an allegation of contempt against their own 
House”.383 This difficulty cannot be overcome by the implementation of any special 
procedures. As regards the hearing rule, the procedures of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate have in recent years been modified in an effort to 
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provide better procedural fairness outcomes for those accused of contempt.
384
 
However, there remain significant issues, particularly in relation to notice and time to 
respond, application of the rules of evidence, and the right to representation by 
counsel. 
 
The penal powers of parliament are inconsistent with the rule of law, that much is 
certain. What then ought to be done about it, is another question in and of itself. A 
common suggestion in the literature is that the penal power should be transferred to 
the courts.
385
 That proposal warrants deeper consideration. That is a discussion for 
another time. As Professor Campbell has said: 
It is one thing to acknowledge that breaches of privilege and contempt of Parliament ought to 
be punished, another to say who ought to determine whether an occasion has arisen for the 
application of penal sanctions.
386
 
Whilst there is little doubt that contempts should not go unpunished, it is clearly the 
case that the current system for that punishment is antithetical to the rule of law. Any 
reform to the penal powers of parliament should ensure consistency with the rule of 
law as classically stated by Dicey. The transfer of the penal jurisdiction of parliament 
to the courts could best achieve this aim.  
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